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I. Introduction1
W
ith the new century, the ‘empirical turn’ in research on deliberation
has focused on assessing to what extent the normative postulates of
deliberative theory may be transferred to daily politics (Habermas
2005). However, the success of the empirical approaches on deliberation on a
small scale (Ryfe 2002; Gastil & Levine 2005; Fung 2007) and in experimental
groups (Mendelberg 2002; Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Fishkin & Luskin 2005;
Karpowitz & Mendelberg 2007) has not been transferred with the same empha-
sis to the analysis of central institutions in representative democracy. In addi-
tion, while the debates on democracy of the 1920s and 1930s placed the
parliament in a central position, recent research on democracy theory has made
evident a notable lack of attention to parliamentary deliberation (Rosales 2014).
This is the case even when, at least normatively, parliaments are considered a
deliberative institution.
The presence of political parties in legislative assemblies at the beginning of
the 20th century modified key elements in the praxis of classical parliamen-
tarism (Manin 1997, pp.195-196), stressing the agonist component of debate in
parliaments. The tension between the deliberative ideal and the empirical reality
of modern parliamentarism was crudely expounded by Carl Schmitt in The Cri-
sis of Parliamentary Democracy [1923], where he denounced the assemblies of
the liberal period that had ended up turning into the scene of confrontation
among parties, reducing the meaning of the institution to the display of con-
flicts, negotiation and vote counting (Schmitt 1985, pp.48-50). Thus, since the
Second World War, parliaments have been mainly studied by political scientists
as a field for partisan battles where voting prevails over argumentation. How-
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ever, neither the predominance of contemporary executives nor the weight of
the political parties in the operation of most democratic parliaments necessarily
mean that this institution has completely lost its deliberative function, i.e., its
capacity for reflection and rational exchange of arguments about the issues cov-
ered.
After Mezey’s seminal work (1979), most of the comparative studies on par-
liaments have focused on their legislative performance and, specifically, on
their active or reactive position before the Executive’s initiatives, i.e., their abil-
ity to pass their own policy proposals or, at least, to modify or reject those for-
mulated by the Government (Norton 1998a, 1998b; Arter 2006; Baldwin 2005).
But addressing parliamentary deliberation involves studying the embeddedness
of this institution in the democratic sphere, which means analyzing not only its
legislative performance but also other functions such as the control of the Exec-
utive or the way that the main political debates are displayed.
However, until recently, empirical research on parliamentary deliberation
has been almost non-existent. The publication of The Mild Voice of Reason
(Bessette 1994) may be considered a turning point. This work criticizes the
dominant interpretation that considers decision-making in the American Con-
gress as a preference aggregation procedure. In contrast to this view, Bessette
relies on the study of specific legislative debates to state that the House of Rep-
resentatives is still a deliberative entity. Subsequently, the work of Lascher
(1996) sets the ground for an empirical approach to this matter by suggesting in-
dicators as well as explanatory factors of legislative deliberation. A decade
later, the group made up of Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli & Steenbergen (Steiner
et al., 2004) opened a quantitative line of research based on their own instru-
ment for measuring deliberation - the Discourse Quality Index - applied to the
discourses generated in parliamentary debates. Other researchers have also used
the Discourse Quality Index (hereafter, DQI) to quantify parliamentary deliber-
ation. For example, Roald & Sangolt (2011) and Lord & Tamvaki (2013) rely
on the DQI in their studies about the level of deliberation in the European Par-
liament, while Marcos-Marné (2015) uses it in his assessment of debates in the
Congreso de los Diputados. In this sense, the DQI constitutes a dominant in-
strument in the measurement of parliamentary deliberation. In addition, other
quantitative approaches - Mucciaroni & Quirk (2006), Bara et al. (2007),
Esterling (2011), Weale et al. (2012) - also focus on the minutes generated by
formal debates within the chambers.
In contrast to the current predominance of this approach, this paper holds
that the study of deliberation in contemporary parliaments cannot rely exclu-
sively on the quantitative analysis of formal debates within the chambers, as this
strategy is insufficient to grasp the complex interconnection of this institution
with other actors of the political system. A merely formal analysis of parliamen-
tary discourses leads to an assessment of deliberation on the basis of a rather
partial manifestation of what goes on in parliaments, dismissing the possibility
of deliberation occurring in private and informal interactions taking place be-
fore the official debates. Alternatively, focusing on the rhetorical dimension of
parliamentary debates makes it possible to capture the agonist nature of this
type of communication and to reveal important determinants in the deliberative
capacity of this institution.
Furthermore, the paper argues that assessing the deliberative impact of this
institution requires a conceptual differentiation between internal deliberation,
aimed at forming the will of the parliament in legislative matters, and an exter-
nal contribution of this body to the debate in the public sphere: both dimensions
broadly correspond to different parliamentary functions, use different commu-
nicative logics and produce different effects on the political system. Therefore,
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the study of deliberation in parliaments also benefits from the ‘systemic turn’ in
deliberative theory (Goodin 2005; Dryzek 2010; Curato 2012; Mansbridge et
al., 2012; Parkinson & Mansbridge 2012; Owen & Smith 2015).
The paper will proceed as follows. The next section highlights some concep-
tual and analytical problems of the DQI as the dominant empirical strategy for
measuring parliamentary deliberation. In the third section, a rhetorical analysis
of parliamentary debate is carried out in order to identify some elements that
condition the deliberative potential of contemporary assemblies. The fourth
section presents a systemic approach that addresses the shortcomings of quanti-
tative strategies such as the DQI. The idea here is that parliamentary delibera-
tion is determined both by structural and contextual factors whose interaction
can only be analyzed through a holistic framework that grasps the embedded-
ness of parliaments within the broader political system. Finally, the paper con-
cludes that agonist and deliberative dynamics coexist in democratic parlia-
ments, while the latter cannot be deemed as a moment of formal, closed and
quantifiable debate.
II. Measuring Parliamentary Deliberation with the Discourse Quality Index
Relying on the analysis of parliamentary debates through the DQI, the group
made up of Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli and Steenbergen (2004) hold that the
fact that an ‘ideal speech situation’ as described by Habermas is rarely produced
in real politics does not dismiss the deliberative model as a regulative criterion
to determine where a given political discourse lies on the ‘total absence of delib-
eration - ideal deliberative situation’ continuum (Steiner 2008, p.189). Here, the
DQI becomes, according to their promoters, the instrument able to measure the
deliberative quality of political discourses.
In the DQI, the unit of analysis is the ‘speech act’, i.e., a discourse delivered
by a speaker during a parliamentary debate (Steiner et al., 2004, pp.52-73). The
text of the discourse, included in the minutes, is broken down into smaller units,
so that only the parts containing a demand or proposal about a specific decision
are coded2, since it is there where potentially deliberative features may be found
(Bächtiger et al., 2007, p.88). This index originally had seven indicators de-
signed to capture the Habermasian concept of deliberation: 1) speaker’s ability
to participate freely in a debate without being interrupted, 2) level of justifica-
tion (to what extent a speech gives good or poor justification for its demands), 3)
content of justifications (whether appeals are made in terms of narrow group in-
terests or in terms of the common good), 4) respect for the groups that are to be
helped through particular policies, 5) respect toward the demands of other ac-
tors, 6) respect toward the counterarguments (whether the speaker ignores or
acknowledges the counterarguments raised by other speakers), 7) ‘constructive
politics’, which measures if the debate leads to consensus building.
As each indicator is paired with coding numerical values, the possibility to
quantitatively measure the deliberative quality of discourses is the main differ-
ence between this empirical approach and other previous experiences (Steiner
et al., 2004, pp.46-47). The reliability of this instrument, as they argue, is
backed by the statistical data showing a great coincidence between the coding
decisions independently made by two different analysts (Steiner et al., 2004,
pp.67-73), which would mean that the indicators and their respective coding
values are clear enough to be applied coherently by different researchers to dif-
ferent debates. Thus, according to their promoters, the DQI accomplishes four
goals: it is theoretically grounded, it applies to observable phenomena, it is gen-
eral and reliable.
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Building upon the DQI these authors test their hypotheses in order to state
that institutional and polarization factors influence the quality of parliamentary
deliberation. Thus, deliberation would be maximized in consensual democra-
cies, with presidential systems (Washington model), when the opposition has
veto power, in debates in second chambers (senates), in fora with no publicity
and on low-polarized issues (Steiner et al., 2004, p.135). Nonetheless, they note
that parliamentary deliberation cannot be explained exclusively relying on
those factors, as there is scope for a different action within the same institutional
context. Thus, although the institutional rules may influence the option for a co-
operative or competitive interaction, this choice can also respond to the basic
strategies of the parties, or to a specific role played by an actor in a certain con-
text. In this sense, they acknowledge that the partisan strategies restrict the de-
liberative potential of many parliamentary debates imposing a limit to the
‘institutional engineering’ (Steiner et al., 2004, pp.122; Bächtiger et al., 2008,
p.287; Bächtiger & Hangartner 2010, p.625).
However, the results provided by applying the DQI to selected parliamen-
tary discourses are puzzling: out of its seven indicators, only the three indicators
intended to capture the deliberative notion of ‘respect’ - to the affected groups,
to the demands of interlocutors and to counterarguments - move coherently in
relation to the main hypotheses. In contrast, the data provided by the remaining
indicators are weakly related with respect to the same discourse, or they even
contradict each other (Steiner et al., 2004, pp.99-104, 165; Bächtiger & Hangar-
tner 2010, p.619). In this regard, the indicator of ‘constructive politics’ is partic-
ularly relevant: in a parliamentary debate where participants are willing to yield
to the force of the better argument, a direct correlation may be expected between
high levels of respect to the counterarguments of the adversary and the changes
in the political positions after the debate. However, the results obtained using
the DQI show a frequent contradiction between, on the one hand, high levels of
respect to counterarguments and demands of the adversary and, on the other,
very low levels in the indicator of ‘constructive politics’, that is, all participants
stand by their initial positions after the debate dismissing any attempt of recon-
ciliation (Steiner et al., 2004, p.136; Bächtiger et al., 2005, p.235; 2007, p.94).
I maintain that the measurement difficulties using the DQI reveal both con-
ceptual and analytical problems. Firstly, Steiner et al. (2004) depart from a
stretched concept of deliberation, which makes them dismiss an essential ele-
ment in Habermasian theory such as sincerity, as they admit that it is impossible
to measure the veracity of the statements made by the legislators (Steenbergen
et al., 2003, p.26; Bächtiger et al., 2005, p.232). Although they state that this dif-
ficulty does not rule out the DQI as a measuring instrument (Steiner et al., 2004,
p.70), the fact is that the incapacity to distinguish between communicative
‘speech acts’ and strategic ‘speech acts’ questions the validity of its coding,
since the DQI is not able to grasp the rhetorical element of parliamentary dis-
courses. Thus, in a debate, legislators can disguise strategic positions with for-
mal appeals to the common good, respect or consensus. The DQI could give a
high deliberative value to hypocritical discourses, since it would attribute high
scores to formal expressions that hide the speaker’s actual intentions.
Instead of concluding that their quantitative instrument does not grasp the
rhetorical elements of parliamentary discourses, latter works within this line of
research develop a sub-index based on the aggregate values of respect in the
original DQI (Bächtiger et al., 2008; Bächtiger & Hangartner 2010). However,
this new measurement leaves aside essential elements of the concept of deliber-
ation. Hypothetically, a parliamentary debate that scored an average amount for
‘respect’ and ‘constructive politics’ could have the same overall DQI score as
one that was high on ‘respect’ and low on ‘constructive politics’. But they
would be far from similar. A debate may reflect high levels of respect and yet
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not be deliberative if the parties are not really willing to yield to the force of the
better argument. In this regard, the Habermasian idea of deliberation cannot be
empirically addressed through partial aggregate indicators without causing a
conceptual change. Deliberation requires respect to the demands and counter-
arguments of the interlocutor as much as it requires a real disposition to change
one’s position if his reasons are more solid than ours3. In fact, Steiner et al.
(2004) conceded in subsequent works that a formal assessment of a discourse’s
properties may validate poor substantive justifications. Paying attention to lan-
guage’s causal particles and to the formal volume of justifications leads to high
values in the coding of parliamentary discourses that may not constitute a good
deliberation (Bächtiger et al., 2010, p.41-42).
The second and most important deficiency of research with the DQI lies in
its analytical approach, excessively focused on the importance of the formal ex-
change of discourses in institutional settings. Reducing the assessment of par-
liamentary deliberation to the study of texts gathered in plenary or committee
sessions involves decontextualizing the meaning of the parliamentary debate,
which takes place within a more complex dynamic. Deliberation involves a
dialogical component which is unlikely to be found in formal discourses dis-
played before a wide audience which, in many cases, it is not primarily consti-
tuted by those sited in the chambers. For instance, the DQI ‘ignores the external
function of discourses’ (García Guitián 2014, p.217), usually targeting audi-
ences beyond the members of parliament, including political actors at infra and
supra-state levels. Focusing on formal stages leads us to miss the interactions
taking place in other contexts and among other actors.
Reducing the idea of parliamentary deliberation to a quantitative assessment
of formal speeches means missing a broader view of the parliament’s actual
embeddedness within the political system and the constraints that such fitting
imposes on the deliberative capacity of its members. Thus, for instance, a Span-
ish legislator feels the pressure to argue in favor of his government’s legal pro-
posal even against his own judgement, due to the close ties between the
Executive and Legislative in a parliamentary model. On the other hand, the rigid
separation between these two powers in the US presidential model allows an
American senator to defend his criteria even against his political coreligionists
in government. As the fourth section of the paper will show, parliamentary ac-
tivity is determined by internal and external factors whose interaction can only
be grasped from a holistic framework.
III. Parliamentary Rhetoric
From an agonist perspective, the legislators want to convince others, not to
be convinced (Hendriks et al., 2007, p.369), which turns this forum into a place
for confrontation, and parliamentary debate into a persuasion game by means of
discourses. In legislative assemblies, unlike discussions aimed at seeking for
truth, the debate is aimed at making decisions within a time limit (Palonen
2008). In addition, speakers represent conflicting political options, which
means that they face discussions with a competitive spirit that encourages the
defense of one’s own statements and the attack on the opposite position (Ilie
2007, p.134). To this effect, language, far from being a neutral vehicle, turns
into a battlefield where contenders try to impose their conceptual frames (Kohn
2000, p.412; Tsakona 2012).
In this sense, a rhetorical analysis makes it possible to contextualize the par-
liamentary discourses within the agonist dynamic where they are given, which
includes strategic and emotional uses, non-verbal elements and interaction be-
tween the speaker and the audience. More precisely, this viewpoint reveals two
dichotomies substantially conditioning the deliberative potential of parlia-
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ments: the dialogical or monological nature of communication; and the exis-
tence (or lack thereof) of publicity in debates.
Firstly, parliamentary discourse is characterized by a regulated interaction
among participants which brings into play institutionalized communication pat-
terns (Ilie 2010a, p.8). In parliamentary debates, a speaker’s intervention is usu-
ally strictly regulated according to internal rules, establishing the conditions for
the presidency to give the floor, the way in which speakers must behave when
they have the floor and the time constraints they must respect (Ilie 2007, p.135).
These norms put clear limits on spontaneity and even more on the possibility of
striking up a real dialogue as expected in deliberation (Landwehr & Holzinger
2010, pp.389-390). The lack of a fluent dialogue usually turns the debate into a
succession of monologues where each legislator defends his position, neither
going into reasoning with the previous speaker nor, consequently, offering ar-
guments to refute him.
Secondly, parliamentary debates today are usually covered by the media in
most democratic countries, so representatives are aware that they are being
evaluated by an audience that goes beyond those present in the chamber (Ilie
2007, p.132; Habermas 2005, p.390). Thus, in a context of partisan battle, the
will to overcome in the public dispute reinforces the agonist dynamic in this fo-
rum. In this regard, the great difference between the current parliamentary de-
bate and that of previous periods is that today the oratory does not aim at
convincing the legislators as much as it aims at justifying before the public opin-
ion the decisions previously taken in other places (Marafioti 2007, pp.95, 105).
Representatives try to meet the expectations of their voters, which makes
them remain firm in their positions rather than contradicting themselves before
their electorate (Stasavage 2007, pp.60-62). On the contrary, debates behind
closed doors allow them to change their positions without fear of penalization
(Chambers 2005, p.260; Elster 1998, pp.109-111). While in the first case pub-
licity contributes to increase the confrontation, in the second case the exchange
of opinions and information in a discreet environment can reduce the discrepan-
cies based on mistaken data or premises, favoring consensus (Stasavage 2007,
p.61). From this perspective, in parliaments, the normative principle of public-
ity would contradict in practice one of the epistemic aims of deliberation, which
is the search for the most reasonable decisions. Deliberation would need public-
ity to safeguard the public interest - restricting the appearance of sectarian inter-
ests - while it would also require reserved contexts to protect the quality of
reasoning or, as Chambers puts it, the ‘Socratic element’ of deliberation. This
‘Socratic element’ requires a debate ‘in dialogue with others’, which can be
achieved more easily in reserved fora (Chambers 2005, p.258).
In fact, a reserved debate does not necessarily involve abandoning public
reason, as nothing keeps participants in a closed deliberation from defending
the general interest. Liberal democracies provide examples of reserved contexts
- supreme courts, cabinet meetings, constitutional committees - which are more
adequate for a calm reasoned discussion for the sake of the collective interest
(Gutmman & Thompson 1996, p.104; Bessette 1994, pp.205-209). Although
nothing guarantees that closed meetings achieve high deliberative standards,
many pressures leading to an agonist dynamic disappear in this context. How-
ever, secrecy increases the risk of participants moving towards negotiation,
pressures or the mere exchange of favors as a way to reach agreements (Cham-
bers 2004, p.404; Elster 1998, p.110). Therefore, we face a dilemma that de-
mands we weigh up the conflicting values according to the circumstances.
At this point it should be borne in mind that, after the so-called ‘rhetorical
turn’ of political theory, the traditional dichotomous opposition between rheto-
ric (emotion) and deliberation (reason) is giving way to views that try to inte-
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grate both ideas coherently (Garsten 2006; Yack 2006; Dryzek 2010). More
precisely, Chambers (2004, pp.401-402) defends the possibility of a ‘delibera-
tive rhetoric’, able to combine the Socratic element of truth-seeking and the po-
litical uses of emotion oriented to the common good. Thus, what this author
calls ‘plebiscitary rhetoric’ would call upon the prejudices and low passions of
the audience, would hide the private interests under deceptions and manipula-
tions, and would be dogmatic and opposed to the autonomy of individuals. On
the contrary, rhetoric can be deliberative when it calls upon the human capacity
for practical judgment and creates a dynamic relationship between the speaker
and the audience, where the former promotes reflection and active reasoning in-
stead of visceral reactions (Chambers 2009, p.335).
Is then plebiscitary rhetoric a communicative style inherent to the parlia-
mentary debate? Although the use of plebiscitary or deliberative rhetoric ulti-
mately depends upon the will of the speaker, both the political culture of the
country and the tradition of each legislative chamber contribute to socialize its
members in certain uses of oratory (Toye 2013, p.5; Bayley 2004, p.14). In this
sense, discursive practices vary greatly across European parliaments, some of
them being more aggressive and focusing on the emotional side, the use of ste-
reotypes and personal attacks than others (Ilie 2010a, p.6). However, keeping
other factors constant, the incentives for a plebiscitary rhetoric will increase as
the partisan competition increases around a discussion, what will tend to happen
in formal and public debates. In short, combining publicity and parliamentary
debate with the partisan interests of political groups tends to reinforce competi-
tive agonism, inviting speakers to use a plebiscitary rhetoric. In addition, this
type of rhetoric is also the result of the difficulties for dialogical communication
in a forum made up of hundreds of individuals with strict rules for oral interven-
tions.
Thus, debates in a big assembly usually end up being dominated by a small
number of charismatic speakers attempting to prevail, calling upon the emo-
tions of the audience and not developing arguments (Elster 1998, p.109). In-
versely, the small size of some parliamentary subcommittees would facilitate
dialogical relations. Together with this, the informal communication among
legislators outside the institutional spaces (in corridors, offices, etc.) could fa-
vor communicative exchanges far from the public pressure, but also beyond the
scope of quantitative indicators (Arter 2006, p.255). These interactions are dis-
missed by the analysis of discourses with the DQI.
IV. Parliaments and Political Systems
Democratic parliaments are not an autonomous actor in the political cycle
(Norton 1998b, p.190). Analyzing what happens inside this institution requires
to understand that it constitutes a convergence point of several dynamics. In this
sense, the different designs of the parliamentary institution and the heterogene-
ity of factors determining the political context of each country hinder the com-
parative studies between legislatures (Arter 2006, p.247). In order to grasp the
interconnection of the parliaments’ internal affairs with the broad political dy-
namics that can affect their deliberative capability, I propose to follow in this
section a systemic approach. To do so, I reformulate Mezey’s (1979) analytical
framework for the comparative study on the parliaments’ legislative autonomy -
further developed by Norton (1998a, 1998b) and McGann (2006) - focusing
this time on the impact of their selected factors on the specific matter of deliber-
ation.
In this sense, there are differences corresponding to the constitutional fram-
ing of the parliament or to its development through internal regulations. Others
are caused by the uses of each assembly. The complexity lies on the fact that the
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constitutional designs interact with the parliaments’ internal regulations, as well
as with other key elements of the political system, in such a way that one-dimen-
sional explanations can rarely be found. Thus, as mentioned before, differences
in the constitutional design may explain the notable independence of the Ameri-
can Congress with respect to the executive power incarnated in the figure of the
President, in contrast to parliamentary models such as the British or the Spanish
(Linz 1994; Norton 1998a, 1998b). However, the cases of dissidence among
British legislators (Kam 2009, pp.1, 3; Baldwin 2005, pp.430-431) notably out-
number those among their Spanish colleagues. Here, elements like the electoral
system or the parliamentary tradition of each country add new explicative fac-
tors.
Focusing on the discourses delivered during parliamentary debates leads us
to miss a broader understanding of the prior interactions taking place in
sub-committees, in contacts with members of the government, in meetings be-
tween legislators and experts or lobbies, in closed meetings of the parliamentary
groups, etc. This empirical-quantitative approach ignores the possibility of de-
liberation taking place in other places that are more discreet, dialogical and in-
formal, in a more diffuse and sequential way. Therefore, the analysis needs to
incorporate a broader view of the internal dynamics and the external determi-
nants that the institution faces regarding its deliberative potential (García
Guitián 2014, p.214). Where are discussions held openly? Which stages and
parliamentary functions favor dialogical discussions? Who determines the leg-
islators’ positions, and how?
Answering these questions requires developing a holistic approach able to
dynamically grasp the main determinants of parliamentary deliberation, taking
into account the influence that both the political system and the internal config-
uration of this institution have on the autonomy of its members. Additionally,
this approach calls for a broader understanding of the parliament’s contribution
to deliberation in the public sphere (Habermas 2005, p.390). When deliberation
is seen from this perspective, partisanship comes up as a key element, as it limits
the representatives’ autonomy to change their position in consideration of the
arguments they listen to. Here, the degree of partisanship in a parliament may
vary depending on factors such as the political culture of the country4; the pres-
ence of a presidential system or a parliamentary system; the type of electoral
system; or the specific design of the committees and sub-committees. Although
these factors do not directly determine the level of deliberation, they encourage
or discourage competitive or cooperative attitudes among legislators who, in
turn, hinder or promote a sincere willingness for deliberation.
In this sense, a systemic approach must distinguish between structural fac-
tors and contextual factors of partisanship in parliaments (see Table 1). While
the former corresponds to stable elements of the political system, the latter refer
to internal determinants of parliamentary activity which may reinforce or re-
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Table 1 - Partisanship in Parliaments
Structural factors Contextual factors
Political Culture Parliamentary Norms and Committee System
Constitutional Design Publicity of Debates
Electoral System Issue Polarization
Electoral Candidatures Absolute / Relative Majority
Parliamentary Function
Source: elaborated by the author.
4For example, Ilie’s study on
the British and Swedish
parliaments found that the first
forum, characteristically
competitive, displayed higher
levels of emotional appeals
and polarization. On the
contrary, debates in the
Swedish assembly focused
more on fact-based
argumentation to show
solvency and personal
credibility (Ilie 2004,
pp.79-82). Here, these
countries’ different political
cultures could explain their
different parliamentary styles.
duce the trend fixed by the structural elements. In this sense, the structural fac-
tors of a country - competitive political culture, Westminster parliamentary
model, proportional electoral system with closed lists, a rigid control of elec-
toral candidatures by the party elite - may make the dominant logic in its parlia-
ment highly partisan and, therefore, discourage deliberation. Nevertheless, fa-
vorable contextual factors may relax that situation in some debates, creating an
environment more propitious for communicative rationality.
Narrowing our focus to the contextual factors, an essential field for analysis
are the parliamentary norms that set the procedures and the internal life of the
institution, since they condition the behavior of the political actors. Strictly re-
garding the scope for deliberation, the analysis must especially stress two as-
pects: the control of the political agenda and the existence of dialogical stages
favoring cooperation over partisan competition. Concerning the first aspect, in
the Westminster model, the governmental control of the parliamentary agenda
through its political majority may avoid the formulation of initiatives that are di-
visive or inappropriate (Carey 2009, p.126; Kam 2009, pp.26-37; Norton
1998a, p.11). On the contrary, when the government does not have a solid par-
liamentary majority, or when the chamber’s regulations guarantee room for mi-
norities in fixing the agenda, the role of the parliament is revitalized (Inter-par-
liamentary Union 2005, pp.24-25).
Focusing on the design of spaces for cooperative dialogue, the role of the
committees and sub-committees acquires a key importance. Once again, the in-
ternal regulations of each parliament determine the relationship of these stages
with the plenary, their material resources and their influence in the parliamen-
tary functions (Laundy 1989). It is common for parliaments to try to confer a su-
pra-partisan spirit on their legislative committees and sub-committees, seeking
cooperative attitudes toward the norms under discussion (Norton 1990, p.145).
The paradigm in this regard are the committees and subcommittees of the
American Congress, which have traditionally defended their final proposals as
the result of an exhaustive deliberation of their members5 (Bessette 1994,
pp.158-162).
Other contextual factors - proposed by Steiner et al. (2004) as original hy-
potheses - refer to the publicity of parliamentary debates, the degree of polariza-
tion of the issue being discussed and the presence or absence of absolute
majorities. Firstly, as explained in the previous section, publicity tends to pro-
mote partisan competition and the subsequent use of a plebiscitary rhetoric,
which explains why most parliamentary committees work behind closed doors
where a real political discussion and negotiation takes place6. Also, discreet par-
liamentary group meetings allow the legislators to have a greater deliberative
influence on the decisions of their group, which will be later defended in the for-
mal bodies of the chamber (Norton 1998b, p.199). Secondly, the less polarized
issues, usually more technical, will tend to favor a constructive attitude among
participants. Thirdly, the absence of an absolute majority obliges the relative
majority in parliament to reach agreements with the opposition or with a coali-
tion partner in order to go ahead with certain initiatives, which may require a
more cooperative style. The ‘variable geometry’ tried by President Rodríguez
Zapatero in the Spanish IX Parliamentary Term (2008-2011) constitutes a good
example of this trend (Casal 2012).
As a last contextual factor, parliamentary interventions can be of very differ-
ent kinds - oral or written questions, discourses given in debates on general poli-
tics, discussions in a committee or sub-committee - and respond to communica-
tive logics as different as dialogue, negotiation, the display of conflict or
discrediting the opponent (Ilie 2010b, pp. 9-12). In this sense, we should distin-
guish analytically among the different parliamentary functions, as it is likely
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5In this sense, innovation
experiences such as the one
developed in the Scottish
parliament are interesting
(Davidson & Stark 2011,
pp.166-171). In addition, the
incorporation of internet and
the new technologies to
parliaments can improve not
only their transparency and
accountability but, perhaps,
the citizens’ involvement on
the legislative process
(Leston-Bandeira 2007;
Bernardes & Leston-Bandeira
2016).
6In this regard, Bessette
mentions the negative effects
on the quality of deliberation
in the American Congress of
the reforms that opened the
legislative process to public
scrutiny between 1960 and
1970 (Bessette 1994,
pp.221-225). Along the same
line, see also Binder and Lee
(2013, p.63) and Warren and
Mansbridge (2013,
pp.106-107).
that the functions of control and political orientation highlight the ‘govern-
ment-opposition’ conflict, while partisanship is relaxed in the legislative de-
bates, when the different groups try to influence the final text of the norms
through their amendments. Therefore, a greater potential for deliberation may
be expected in interactions corresponding to the legislative function.
Finally, we must widen the analytical scope to assess the impact of parlia-
mentary activity within the global political system (Habermas 1996). From this
angle, deliberation in parliaments should be seen through the lens of the ‘sys-
temic turn’ in deliberative theory (Owen & Smith 2015). Concretely, the notion
of ‘deliberative system’ developed by Parkinson & Mansbridge (2012) high-
lights the possibility of looking at the deliberative ideal beyond deliberative ex-
periences at the local level and in experimental groups. In this sense, what is
important for a large-scale deliberative democracy is to use institutional designs
to create a well-crafted division of deliberative labor that finally achieves a
global impact on the broad public sphere.
According to this framing, while the parliament’s legislative function usu-
ally corresponds to an internal deliberation aimed at shaping the political will of
this body, the function of controlling the government connects with the debate
in the public sphere. From this angle, the control function - as well as the de-
bates on general politics, investiture, presidential statements - contributes to dis-
seminating plural information and arguments that help the citizens to form their
own political judgment before they exercise electoral accountability (Haber-
mas, 2005, p.388; 2006, p.421). Hence, there would be two different communi-
cative dynamics in parliaments: a legislative deliberation, of an internal nature,
and an external communication around government control and the debates on
general politics. The first allows alternate formal debate stages and informal di-
alogue in private places, seeking for cooperation among the involved actors.
The second one, an inherently public dynamic, tends to monologue and compe-
tition, and thus is often accompanied by plebiscitary rhetoric. However, this
kind of debate may end up indirectly introducing issues for deliberation in the
public sphere.
V. Conclusion
Although we should not expect parliaments to show the high deliberation
standards that may be achieved in other fora carefully designed for that exclu-
sive purpose (Warren 2007, p.284), this does not rule out the existence of delib-
erative moments in contemporary legislatures. Contributing to the growing
interest on this question, this essay suggests that studying deliberation in parlia-
ments requires combining the empirical, rhetorical and systemic approaches in
a flexible framework for analysis. Thus, the paper has highlighted two impor-
tant weaknesses of the DQI as the main quantitative tool for measuring delibera-
tion. In the first place, it cannot measure the sincerity of the speakers, which is
one of the key elements in the Habermasian theory of communicative speech
acts. Hence, the DQI could give high deliberative scores to hypocritical or stra-
tegic uses of language. In the second place, focusing on the formal exchange of
discourses in parliamentary sessions implies searching for deliberation in situa-
tions where publicity and partisan competition incentive a plebiscitarian rheto-
ric.
The complexity of studying deliberation in parliaments comes from their
special position as an intersection point between deliberative theory and empiri-
cal political science. Hence, the heterogeneous nature of this institution recom-
mends studying the deliberative phenomenon in different moments in the life of
legislatures through a plurality of strategies, where qualitative methods must
play a relevant role. No instrument to measure deliberation is self-sufficient,
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which means that the best alternative is combining them (Dryzek 2005). In ad-
dition, since potentially deliberative communication may take place in dialo-
gical and informal stages, approaching this phenomenon requires an explora-
tion of the reality hidden behind the discourses. Thus, in-depth interviews with
selected parliamentary actors are especially useful, as they provide an indirect
approach to the exchanges that take place in private spaces.
Finally, a systemic approach allows us to integrate the determinants re-
sponding to the internal organization of the parliamentary activity together with
those caused by the insertion of this institution within each political system.
This approach also allows us to tackle the parliament’s contribution to delibera-
tion in the broad political sphere. In this explanatory model many deliberation
types are distributed along different institutions: governments, parliaments, po-
litical parties, civil society, media (Habermas 1996; 2005; 2006; Goodin 2005;
Neblo 2005; Warren 2007; Curato 2012). From this angle, parliaments have a
twofold deliberative potential: one with an internal projection in the formation
of its political will, and another with an external projection as an essential part
of a complex network of democratic institutions.
Carlos Rico Motos (cmrico@comillas.edu) has a PhD in Political Sciences from Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and works
currently as Assistant Professor at the Universidad Pontificia Comillas.
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O processo deliberativo nos parlamentos: uma revisão das abordagens empíricas, retóricas e sistêmicas
RESUMO Introdução: Discutimos três abordagens diferentes para estudar o processo de deliberação nos parlamentos: empírica,
retórica e sistêmica. Materiais e Métodos: Através de uma revisão crítica da literatura científica, abordamos alguns problemas
conceituais e analíticos das abordagens empírico-quantitativas destinadas a mensurar a deliberação parlamentar, enfatizando a
utilidade das abordagens retóricas e sistêmicas para apreender o componente conflitivo dos debates parlamentares e sua inserção no
sistema político mais amplo. Resultados: A dinâmica deliberativa das câmaras democráticas não pode ser reduzida a um debate for-
mal, fechado e quantificável. Por isso, propomos um modelo alternativo para a análise dos processos deliberativos. Discussão: A
natureza heterogênea dos parlamentos recomenda analisar o fenômeno deliberativo em diferentes momentos e instâncias, que
incluem debates formais, reuniões a portas fechadas e até trocas informais fora do plenário e das comissões. Essa visão desafia o
predomínio do enquadramento empírico-quantitativo da deliberação parlamentar na literatura e defende uma estratégia de pesquisa
mais holística, baseada na combinação das abordagens empírica, retórica e sistêmica.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: parlamentos; deliberação; retórica; Índice de Qualidade do Discurso; revisão da literatura.
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